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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
We assess some of the major themes and impactsof welfare reform that
have emerged for states and families during thethree years since the
passage of the 1996 welfare reformbill, PRWORA. The major themes for
states include: (1) a work-first approach tocash assistance, (2) large
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increases in federal funding for childcare, (3) increasing diversity in
state and local cash assistance and child-careprograms, (4) the beginning
stages of the integration of diverse child-careprograms, and (5) the sever-
ing of the link between child-care assistance andcash assistance in some
states. Changes for families include (1) increases in financial incentivesto
work; (2) mandatory work-related activityrequirements, sanctions if
requirements are not met, and time limitson cash-assistance receipt;
(3) increased availability of child-care subsidies;and (4) a different envi-
ronment and culture at welfare officesstressing work andpersonal
responsibility. Assessment of impacts on state and localgovernment and
low-income families with childrenare at an early stage. The clearest
impact is the marked decline in the number of individualsreceiving cash
assistance and the equally marked increase in the number ofchildren
being cared for in nonfamilial settings. A markedlyincreased proportion
of cash-assistance recipients are workingor in other approved activities.
Increased child-care subsidies appear to have increased theearnings of
both current and former welfare recipients andother low-income fami-
lies. Preliminary results suggest that workrequirements and time limits
have succeeded in moving low-incomewomen with children into jobs,
but have decreased the wages theyare able to obtain compared to women
who are not subject to time limits.
1. INTRODUCTION
The United States undertook a major reform of the welfaresystem with
the passage of the Personal Responsibility and WorkOpportunity Act
(PRWORA) in August 1996. In passing PRWORA,legislators articulated
the following goals for reform: (1) provide assistanceto needy families so
that children may be cared for in theirown homes or in the homes of
relatives; (2) end the dependence of needyparents on government bene-
fits by promoting job preparation, work, andmarriage; (3) prevent and
reduce the incidence of out-of-wedlock pregnancies;and (4) encourage
the formation and maintenance of two-parent families.
To date, most attention has focusedon moving welfare recipients from
cash assistance to work in order to lower families' dependenceon pub-
lic support. But this push toward work lendseven greater importance to
a second focus of the law, provision of public support for childcare. As
stated in the recently released TANF regulations, inimplementing wel-
fare reform, states should carefully provide for andprotect "needy and
vulnerable children." Caring for low-income children whiletheir parents
are working is certainly one aspect of this duty. To this end,an impor-
tant part of PRWORA provides additional funding tostates for child-careWelfare Reform under PRWORA 159
services for low-income families and to improve the quality and supply
of child care. In addition, PRWORA attempts to simplify the complex
child-care system by combining programs and provides states some in-
creased flexibility in setting policy.
The passage of welfare reform has led to changes in many social pro-
grams, and the new system is still evolving. However,sufficient time has
now passed to allow examination of some ofthe major changes states
have made in response to welfare reform. In this paper, we focus on two
areas of change: the new cash-assistance programknown as Temporary
Aid for Needy Families (TANFTitle I of PRWORA), which replaced Aid
to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), and the programthat pro-
vides low-income families with subsidies to purchase care for their chil-
dren, the Child Care Development Fund (CCDFTitle VI of PRWORA).
The intent of this paper is threefold: to provide an overview description
and assessment of the changes PRWORA made to these two social wel-
fare programs, to discuss how these reforms changed incentives for states
and families, and to provide a preliminary assessment of the impact of
PRWORA on state and local governments and low-income families with
children.
In the next section of the paper, we consider the changed incentive
system faced by state and local governments. We first reviewchanges in
the cash-assistance program. We provide an overview of TANF and
assess the ways in which changes altered theincentives facing states,
particularly incentives to increase the number of TANF families that
work. We also describe the way in which state and local governments
have, to date, responded to the changed incentives they face.
We next provide an overview of the changes in child-care programs.
Our discussion of child-care programs is more detailed because the na-
ture of these programs is less well known. We proceed todiscuss
changes in incentives for states under the CCDF and describe how state
and local child-care programs have evolved since the passage of
PRWORA.
In the third section of the paper, we examine how some of the
changes in state policies affect family incentives to work and to re-
ceive cash assistance and provide a preliminary assessment of the
impact of these changes on the employment and earnings of low-
income families with children. The fourth section describes the employ-
ment and child-care arrangements of low-income families whohave
recently left welfare, using data from the National Survey of America's
Families. These data provide a picture of family outcomes in the early
stages after welfare reform. The final section of the paper contains our
conclusions.160Loprest, Schmidt & Witte
2. CHANGES IN STATE INCENTIVES
UNDER PRWORA
PRWORA changed incentives for states and families, its major changes
being in income-support and child-care policies for families with chil-
dren. In this section, we first describe the changes made to cash assis-
tance, focusing on the structure of funding and program rules that
encourage work and limit dependency among welfare recipients. We
describe how these changes altered the incentives faced by stategovern-
ments and the way in which states have altered their cash-assistance
policies since the passage of PRWORA. We then describe the changes
in state child-care programs, including the incentives inherent in these
programs and how they have changed since PRWORA.
2.1 Cash-Assistance Policies
This subsection reviews the changes to cash-assistance policies imder
PRWORA, focusing on the changes in funding mechanisms and policy
changes and state responses that encourage work and reduce depen-
dency. We start with a brief history of cash-assistanceprograms.
2.1.1 A Short History of Cash-Assistance Programs The first federal
cash-assistance program for families with children was Aid to Dependent
Children, established by the Social Security Act of 1935 and renamed Aid
to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) in 1962. AFDC provided
cash assistance for needy children who have been deprived of parental
support or care because their father or mother was absent from the home,
incapacitated, deceased, or unemployed. AFDC was state-administered
and funded jointly by the federal government and state governments.
The program was an entitlement, that is, all families that met certain
categorical and financial requirements were entitled to benefits.
States could not determine who was eligible for AFDC, but could set
benefit levels. The level of AFDC benefits varied widely across states. In
early 1996, monthly benefits for a single-parent family with two children
and no income ranged from $120 in Mississippi to in Vermont, even
higher in Alaska and Hawaii.
The number of cash-assistance recipients fluctuated broadly between
the 1960s and the 1990s. As can be seen in Figure 1, approximately 3 mil-
lion people received benefits in 1960, less than 2 percent of the U.S.
population. Between the late 1960s and early 1970s, the number of recipi-
ents more than tripled. The AFDC rolls experienced a second growth
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states, it reinforced aspects of policies theywere alieady implementing
or wanted to implement.
The shape and form of state TANFprograms are still evolving. Some
states have substantially transformed their systems, whileothers have
made relatively few changes beyond federalrequirements.2
2.1.2 Funding Changes: From Matching Fundsto Block GrantsChanges
in the structure and amount of funding for cashassistance and increased
state autonomy over how to use welfare funds have changedstates' incen-
tives. One of the major changes for states in the PRWORAlegislation was
moving from a state-federal matching system for fundingcash assistance
to a federal block grant to states.
The annual level of the TANF blockgrant remains basically fixed for
the duration of PRWORA, until 2002. Theamount each state receives is
based on the level of federal contributionsto the state for the AFDC,
JOBS, and Emergency Assistanceprograms in 1994.
Under AFDC, federal funding for the cash-assistanceprogram required
a state match. The proportion of funding that stateswere required to
provide was inversely related to state per capita income. In1996, the last
year of the AFDC program, high-income states were required to provide
$.50 for each $1 of federal funding, and low-incomestates matched at a
lower rate. For example, Mississippiwas only required to provide $.22 for
each $1 of federal funding in 1996.
Conceptually, the change to a block grant introducesan incentive for
states to decrease their program spending, since each additionaldollar of
program expenditure beyond the federal block-grant level isnow more
costly. In the block-grant system of funding, themarginal additional
dollar of increased funding above the level of thefederal grant must
come entirely from the state. Under a pure block grant, withno other
funding restrictions, states could potentially chooseto spend less than or
exactly the federal block grant on cash assistance, andprovide no state
funds.
To counter the incentive toward decreased spending,PRWORA re-
quires that states maintain their spending for welfareprograms at 80
percent of their 1994 spending levels, witha reduction to 75 percent if
states meet other work-participation requirements. The blockgrant to
2Our discussion below reflects the most up-to-date informationavailable during the sum-
mer of 1999, generally data for 1997 and 1998.
The exception is that about 20 states will receive 2.5-percentincreases in funds each fiscal
year because of high population growth or low 1994 AFDC benefit levels, 35percent or less
of the national average.Welfare Reform under PRWORA 163
the states is reduced $1 for every $1 by whichthe state falls short of this
maintenance of effort (MOE) requirement.
Given that block-grant funding was set relative to aprior year and
caseloads declined considerably between 1994 and1997, most states got
an initial windfall increase infunding over what their matching funds
would have been under AFDC. The U.S. GeneralAccounting Office
(1998a) estimated that the TANF block grantfor 45 states exceeded
the federal funding level they would havereceived under the AFDC
program.
FY 1998 was the first full year that all statesimplemented TANF. State
reports of expenditures indicate that all states metthe MOE requirement
needed to draw down all federal funds available tothem under the
TANF block grant. Most states reported(although not required to do so)
that their spending exceeded their MOErequirement (Administration
for Children and Families, 1999b).
Under PRWORA, states have substantially morefreedom in deciding
how they spend funds. States may spend theblock grant "in any manner
that is reasonably calculated to accomplishthe purpose" of PRWORA.
Large caseload declines have presentedthe possibility for states to in-
crease per-case spending evenwithout increasing state expenditures.
States can use their TANF block grantsfor cash assistance and/or for a
broad array of other purposes (e.g., child-careand transportation assis-
tance) designed to benefit needy families withchildren. The greater free-
dom in the use of funds may lead to greaterspending as states are able to
design programs that are more attuned totheir own preferences.
PRWORA also removed the entitlement to cash assistancefor low-
income families with children. Since federalTANF program funding wifi
not grow with each new eligible family, states maydecide not to serve
some families who meeteligibffity requirements. This means that during
a recession the TANF program,unless altered, wifi not see the increase
in federal expenditures with new recipientsthat would have occurred
under the AFDC entitlement program.
In the current strong economy and withdeclining caseloads, the fixed
block grant through 2002 provides incentivesfor states to reserve part of
their initial windfall for the next economicdownturn or other unex-
pected events. These reserved funds,allowed under PRWORA, are
sometimes referred to as "rainy day funds."The law puts no limits on
the amount of funds that can be reservedfrom one year to the next.4
' The final TANF regulations indicate that funds carried over fromprevious years can only
be spent on certain activities defined as "assistance."For further discussion of this poten-
tial limitation see Schott, et al. (1999).164Loprest, Schmidt & Witte
As of the end of the first quarter of FY 1999, states'cumulative unobli-
gated balances of TANF block-grant fundswere $4.2 billion, or 12 percent
of the total federal TANF funds awarded thestates since implementation
of the TANF program (Administration for Childrenand Families, 1999a).
Concerns have been raised that these unused fundsmay be viewed by
Congress as a reason to cut future levels of the blockgrant or as a source of
funds for other desired spending. Some in Congresshave suggested that
states should return unused TANF funds to the federalgovernment to be
used on program expansion andnew programs, but no action has been
taken. The House has recently proposed cutting theamount of the TANF
block grant.
2.1.3 Program Structure: Flexibility and RequirementsPRWORA gave
states broad flexibility to create new transitional assistanceprograms for
families with children. At the same time itput in place some specific
requirements that states must follow or face financial penalties.The law
made many specific changes to cash assistance. We focushere on the
changes that are likely to have the greatest impacton work.5
The major changes in TANF thatwere intended to decrease depen-
dency and promote work under PRWORAare the federal work participa-
tion requirements and the limits on length of time familiescan receive
federally-funded benefits. The financial penalties associatedwith not
meeting work requirements increase states' incentivesto move families
receiving transitional assistance into work and workactivities as rapidly
as possible.
New TANF RequirementsEach state must meet federally-set work
participation requirements. The overall work participationrequirement
for all families started at 25 percent of the caseloadin FY 1997, rose to 40
percent of the caseload in FY 2000, and wifi rise to 50percent of the
caseload in FY 2002. The minimum participationrate for two-parent
families was 75 percent in FY 1997 and increasedto 90 percent in FY
1999. States may exempt single parents with childrenunder age one
from the work requirement.6 PRWORA also allowsa reduction of the
Some of the changes we do not discuss here include increases in eligibilityfor two-parent
families, caps on benefits for additional children, changes in howmuch child support can
be passed on to families, reduced eligibility for immigrants, andadditional requirements
for teen parents.
6 States are allowed to calculate thesepercentages out of the population with children over
age one, if they choose to exempt these parents from work requirements. Forty-fivestates
have exempted families with a child underage one or a younger age cutoff. Other than this
group, regardless of state policy on exempting persons from work requirements, all fami-
lies with an adult beneficiary are included.Welfare Reform under PRWORA 165
work participation requirement by the amount of a state's caseload de-
cline since 1995. Caseload reduction has been so great that the effective
work participation requirements for many states are relatively low. For
example, Indiana had an adjusted requirement of 5 percent and Wiscon-
sin 8 percent in 1997.
PRWORA also requires nonexempt recipients to participate in work or
work activities within 24 months of initial benefit receipt. Most states
have adopted a requirement of participation by 24 months or whenever
the recipient is determined to be ready to work, whichever is earlier.
Several states have set shorter periods; for example, Wisconsin requires
immediate participation, and Virginia requires participation within 90
days.
The law also defines the set of work activities that can count toward
the participation requirements. This set is more limited than under past
programs, putting greater emphasis onwork and short-term job readi-
ness activities as opposed to longer-termtraining and education. For
example, a maximum of 12 months of vocational education can be
counted.
One of the major changes in the new law is the limit on the time
recipients can receive benefits. Adult recipients can receive at most five
years of benefits from TANF federalfunds over their lifetime. States
have the option of setting lifetime limits of less than five years. States can
make payments beyond five years using their own funds. States can also
give exemptions to the time limit for up to 20 percent of their caseload.
As of the end of 1997, twenty-one states had time limits of less than 60
months for at least some recipients (Gallagher et al., 1998). In some of
these states, families reaching the shorter time limit lose only a portion
of their benefits. On the other hand, two states, Michigan and Vermont,
have no benefit time limit, pledging to use state funds to extend benefits
for those who continue to be eligible after 60 months. California plans to
continue payments to children, but not to adult family members, after
the family has received 60 months of benefits.
States have varied criteria for exempting families from the time limit
(Bloom, 1999). Some exemptions are determined at eligibffity and keep
"the clock from ticking"; others are determined at the time a family hits
the time limit. Some criteria are clear-cut, such as an adult being over a
certain age limit, and others are more subjective, such as if a family
"played by the rules" and still has a very low level of income.
States have been reasonably successful in moving welfare recipients
into work activities, at least in comparison with the federalmandates.
For FY 1997, all states met their all-family work participation require-
ment. In part this was due to states' credits for thecaseload reductions.166Loprest, Schmidt & Witte
Many states, however, had trouble meeting the two-parent participation
requirement.
State Program Changes to Increase WorkIn addition to responding to
the federal work requirements and time limits in PRWORA, states have
used their new flexibility to structure other aspects of their welfare pro-
grams to encourage work and responsibility and decrease dependency.
These changes include new financial incentives to work as well as
changes in the structure and emphasis of program services.
Most states have simplified the treatment of earnings, compared to
AFDC rules, and have altered their earnings disregards to encourage
work. While AFDC required states to disregard a portion of earned in-
come, the amount was limited and had a steep phase-out period. Many
states have increased the amount of earnings that can be disregarded or
have eliminated the phase-out period. For example, California now disre-
gards $225 of earnings and 50 percent of the remainder for an unlimited
number of months. Connecticut disregards all earnings below poverty,
with a family remaining eligible as long as earnings are below poverty.
These changes reflect state priorities to "make work pay" as well as help to
ensure that states meet federally imposed work requirements.
In addition to more generous earnings disregards, many states inte-
grated a system of work supports into their TANF programs. Work
supports include subsidies for work expenses. This decreases the cost of
work, at least over the term of the subsidy, increasing the financial
returns to work. Work subsidies for recipients include child care, health
insurance, transportation costs, uniforms and tools, and even licensing.
State Changes in Program Structure and EmphasisIn addition to increas-
ing financial incentives to work, many states have changed the structure
of their programs to emphasize and require work. Nathan and Gals
(1999) argue that PRWORA provided a strong signal that the federal
government was permanently changing the nature of public assistance,
encouraging states to restructure programs and move toward a more
employment-focused system.7
Nearly every state has instituted "social contracts" or other personal-
responsibility agreements in which recipients agree to specific steps
toward self-sufficiency. Many states are enforcing these agreements,
sanctioning people who fail to sign or live up to their agreements. While
See Quint et al. (1999) for a discussion of the implementation of welfare reform in large
cities, and Nathan and Gals (1999) for a study of the implementation of welfare reform in
20 states.Welfare Reform under PRWORA 167
the AFDCJOBS program had sanctions for not following certain require-
ments, under TANF many states have chosen to expand their use of
sanctions. States are also making sanctions more severe, imposing larger
benefit reductions for longer periods more quickly. Fourteen states, in-
cluding Florida and Ohio, now have full benefit reduction, meaning total
loss of benefits, for an initial failure to comply with work-activities re-
quirements (Gallagher et al., 1998).
In addition, many states are putting emphasis on diverting potential
recipients from the welfare rolls. For the most part, diversion programs
use lump-sum payments either in cash to the family or to athird party
(for example, for rent, utilities, or car repair). By accepting the upfront
diversion payment, the family generally agrees not to reapply for cash
assistance for a specified period of time: e.g., receipt of a diversion
payment equal to 3 months of benefits requires the family's agreement
not to reapply for benefits for 3 months.8
In addition to diversion payments, some states have implemented
mandatory applicant job search as a condition of TANF eligibility to
encourage work-ready applicants to find jobs rather than receivetransi-
tional assistance.
Almost all states have moved to work-first models for their welfare
programs, requiring recipients to move quickly into availablejobs.9 One
aspect of moving away from writing assistance checks and moving to-
wards a work-focused system is that states are using more of their
welfare funding to provide services. Most state welfare programs now
provide more work-related services (e.g., work preparation, job search,
job placement) and provide these services to a greater proportion of
recipients than under JOBS.
Based on state-reported expenditure data for TANF and the Child
Care Development Fund (CCDF), states are spending less on direct cash
assistance while investing more resources in supportive services (Na-
tional Association of State Budget Officers, 1998). On average states
used 65 percent of their MOE funds and 69 percent of their federal TANF
funds for cash assistance. However, the range of expenditures on cash
assistance was wide (Administration for Children and Families, 1999b).
2.2 Child-Care Policy
PRWORA changed federal child-care policy in several important ways.
The law increased federal funding for child care substantially. In addition,
it eliminated the requirement that states spend their own funds on child
8For in-depth discussion of these policies see Maloy et al. (1998).
For more information about work-first programs see Holcomb et al. (1998).168Loprest, Schmidt & Witte
care, but gave states an incentive to maintain and increase their funding.
PRWORA also gave states the option of transferring up to 30 percent of
their TANF grant to the Child Care Development Fund, thereby increas-
ing the pooi of funds available for child care. The legislation eliminated
the federal entitlement to child care for families on and transitioning off
cash assistance, but provided states with an incentive to continue to give
welfare families priority for the receipt of subsidy funds. The law gave
states some additional flexibility in setting policies regarding eligibility,
the amount paid to providers, and families' share of child-care costs.
States also have more latitude in the use of funds to improve the quality of
child care and to increase the supply of care.
2.2.1 A Short History of Federal Child-Care Programs As with cash
assistance, the federal government's role in child care began with the
New Deal, which created federally funded nursery schools for poor
children. The schools were designed primarily to create jobs for unem-
ployed teachers, nurses, and others to provide a healthy environment
for children in poverty. With the advent of World War II, many of these
schools were continued and expanded to provide care for the children
of "Rosie the Riveter." Under the Lanham Act, child care was provided
for an estimated 550,000 to 600,000 children. The Lanham Act termi-
nated in 1946.
After 1946, the federal government largely withdrew from the child-
care arena until the 1960s, although some states, like California, contin-
ued to provide publicly funded child care. As part of the war on poverty,
Head Start was begun in 1965 to provide comprehensive services to poor
3- to 5-year-olds on a part-day, part-year basis.
The 1988 Family Support Act expanded the federal government's role
in child care as part of a larger effort to encourage welfare recipients to
find employment. The act created two federal child-care programs: the
AFDCJOBS Child Care program and the Transitional Child Care Pro-
gram (TCC). Both programs were entitlements guaranteeing assistance
to all eligible families currently on public assistance that were working or
in other approved activities (e.g., participating in the JOBS program).
The TCC program provided subsidies to working former AFDC recipi-
ents for a year after they left the AFDC rolls.
The 1990 Omnibus Reconciliation Act made child-care subsidies avail-
able to families who did not receive cash assistance under the At-Risk
Child Care Program and the Child Care and Development Block Grant
(CCDBG). The At-Risk program targeted families who were at risk of
going on AFDC, which in practice included most low-income families.
Collectively, the At-Risk Child Care Program, the TCC program, and theWelfare Reform under PRWORA 169
AFDC-JOBS child-care programs are referred to as Title TV-A child-care
programs because they were created under Title TV-Aof the Social Secu-
rity Act (Committee on Ways and Means, 1996). The CCDBG was de-
signed to help states provide child care to low-income families and to
fund activities to improve the quality and supply of child care for all
families. No family was entitled to receive child-care subsidies under the
At-Risk or the CCDBG child-care programs.
The 1996 welfare reform legislation consolidated the four federal low-
income child-care programs into a single block grant, the CCDF.'° The
goal of the program is to fund child-care services (including subsidies)
for low-income families, "as well as activities intended to improve the
overall quality and supply of child care for families in general" (Commit-
tee on Ways and Means, 1998). The creation of theCCDF was intended
to simplify the administration of child-care subsidies byreducing the
complexity of regulations governing them, and to give states additional
flexibility in allocating their funds. Welfare families and families transi-
tioning off welfare are not entitled to receive assistance under the CCDF.
2.2.2 Changes in Funding for Child Care The creation of the CCDF
resulted in three important changes in the way that child care is funded.
First, it substantially increased the level of federal funding for child care.
Second, while CCDF consolidated four child-care funding streams, it
created a complicated system that mixes features of block grants and a
matching-fund system. The system also has MOE requirements. Under
the CCDF, states are not required to spend their own funds on child
care. However, the funding system providesincentives for states to
maintain and increase their child-care spending. Third, it permitted
states to spend TANF dollars on child care.
Increase in Child-Care FundingPerhaps the most important change
in child-care funding resulting from PRWORA was the increase in fed-
eral funding. The additional funds allowed states to serve more low-
income families and/or to more generously fund the families served. The
total federal funding to states under CCDF was $2.56 billion in 1997 and
$2.80 billion in 1998 (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services,
1999). The 1997 funding level represented a 27-percent increase over the
funding level that would have occurred under the pre-PRWORA pro-
grams (Long, Kirby, Kurka, and Waters, 1998).
10To avoid confusion, this paper will refer to the new low-income child-care funding
stream created under the 1996 welfare reform legislation as the Child CareDevelopment
Fund (CCDF). The CCDF was created as part of the reauthorization of the Child Care and
Development Block Grant.170Loprest, Schmidt & Witte
Changes in Program Funding RulesLike AFDC, the AFDC-JOBS and
TCC programs were funded by a state-federal matching system. The
federal government matched each state dollar spent at the Medicaid
matching rate. The At-Risk child-care program had thesame state-
federal matching system as the AFDC-JOBS and TCC programs, but the
amount of the funds the state could receive from the federal government
was capped. Only one of the four pre-PRWORA federal child-care pro-
grams did not require states to put up matching fundsthe Child Care
and Development Block Grant. Under CCDBG, states receiveda block
grant. The amount of the grant depended on the proportion of children
under age five in the state, the number of children receiving freeor
reduced-price lunches, and state per capita income.
Like CCDBG, CCDF guarantees states a minimal level of child-care
funding regardless of how much the states spend from their own coffers.
However, like the Title IV-A child-care programs, CCDF provides an
incentive for states to maintain or increase their child-care funding. In-
deed, states have more incentives to increase child-care spending under
CCDF than they did under the pre-PRWORA system.
Under CCDF, federal funding for child-care subsidies is consolidated.
However, the consolidated fund has three distinct components. Each
component is governed by a different set of rules. To be specific, under
CCDF, a state's funding for child-care subsidies has three separate com-
ponents, referred to as (1) mandatory funds, (2) matching funds, and (3)
discretionary funds h1
States are entitled to receive mandatory funds, which are also known
as guaranteed funds, regardless of how much state money they spend
on child care. States need only meet their MOE requirements under
TANF to be eligible for these funds. Each state's amount of mandatory
funds is based on the state's federal allocation under the three Title TV-A
programs.12 The mandatory funds are not subject to the annual govern-
ment appropriation process. The federal government allocated approxi-
mately $1.2 billion in mandatory CCDF funds to states for FY 1997
through FY 2000.
The rules governing matching funds gives states an incentive to main-
tain or increase their child-care spending. To receive matching funds,
states must meet both matching and MOE requirements. They also must
have spent all of their mandatory federal funds. To meet their MOE
For the interested reader, Greenberg (1996) provides details of CCDF funding mecha-
nisms, and Committee on Ways and Means (1998) provides a useful summary.
12The state's allocation is equal to the federal allocation in 1994, the allocation in 1995, or
the average of the 1992-1994 allocations, whichever is highest.Welfare Reform under PRWORA 171
requirements, states must maintain at least their level of funding under
Title TV-A programs. States spent $908 million to meet their maintenance
of effort requirements in FY 1998.
Each dollar that a state spends beyond its MOE requirement is
matched at the state's 1995 Medicaid matching rate. When drawing
down matching funds, the marginal cost of each additional state dollar
spent on child care varies from $.21 for Mississippi to $.50 in relatively
high-income states like California. The maximum amount of matching
funds available to a state depends on the state's share of the total num-
ber of children under 13 in the U.S. In FY 1998, states provided $724
million and the federal government $551 million under the matching-
fund program (Administration for Children and Families, 1999c).
Finally, states may receive discretionary funding under CCDF. The
level of these funds varies from year to year at Congress's discretion,
and is subject to the annual appropriation process. A state's share of
discretionary funds is determined using the same funding formula as for
CCDBG (see above). Discretionary spending has no matching or MOE
requirements. Congress may also earmark particular parts of the discre-
tionary funds for certain activities. In FY 1998, Congress allocated $975
million to the discretionary part of the CCDF. Fifty million of these funds
was earmarked for improving the quality of infant and toddler care,and
$18.6 million was earmarked for improving school-aged child care and
for resource and referral services.
Spending TANF Funds on Child Care PRWORA makes another impor-
tant change to the child-care funding process: it allows states to spend
up to 30 percent of their TANF block grant on child care (Greenberg and
Savner, 1998). States now have the flexibility to focus more of their
TANF dollars on employed parents who are former recipients of cash
assistance or on low-income families that have never received TANF.
States can spend TANF dollars on child care in two different ways.
First, they can transfer the funds to the CCDF. The transferred funds are
subject to CCDF regulations.13 Second, states can fund child care directly
from the TANF program. Child-care funds coming directly through
TANF are not necessarily subject to CCDF regulations (Committee on
Ways and Means, 1998).
13 In addition, states were allowed to meet their TANF maintenance-of-effort requirements
by counting funds spent on state early-childhood education and care programs. A handful
of states (Arizona, California, Iowa, and Wyoming) did so (Department of Health and
Human Services, 1998a). Such state programs could fulfill the MOE requirements if they
did not separately qualify for a federal match in a different program (Committee on Ways
and Means, 1998). For example, states could not count child-care funds towards both the
MOE requirements for TANF and the MOE or matching requirements for CCDF.172Loprest, Schmidt & Witte
Receiving child-care funding directly through TANF and not through
CCDF can have an important implication for unemployed parents. Par-
ents who are not employed are subject to TANF time limits when receiv-
ing child-care assistance directly through the TANF block grant, but not
when receiving child care under CCDF (Greenberg and Savner, 1998).14
States' ResponsesStates have responded to federal incentives by in-
creasing or maintaining their funding for child-care subsidies. As noted
in the TANF section, all states met their TANF MOE requirement in
1998, and thus all states qualified for their full share of mandatory CCDF
funding. In 1998, all 50 states and the District of Columbia drew down all
of their CCDF matching funds by meeting their MOE and matching
requirements.
Overall, state spending on child care has grown substantially since
PRWORA. Expenditures of state dollars for child care grew by an aver-
age of 24 percent a year from 1996 through 1998. However, changes in
state expenditures varied widely. For example, the National Association
of State Budget Officers (NASBO) estimates that Nevada's expenditures
of state funds on child care increased from $0.5 million in 1996 to $5.7
million in 1998, while Nebraska's declined from $12.7 million in 1996 to
$9.4 million in 1998. Available budget numbers suggest that most, but
not all, states have a strong commilutent to funding child care (National
Association of State Budget Officers, 1998).
As a result of the increases in funding, the number of children receiv-
ing child-care subsidies has increased markedly since PRWORA at the
same time that TANF caseloads have declined. In a study of seven
states, GAO (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1998a) found that 17%
more children were receiving child-care subsidies in 1997 than in 1996.
The CCDF matching and MOE requirements are just one of the rea-
sons why states have increased their child-care funding. There are at
least four other important reasons. First, states have an incentive and a
desire to increase work and work-related activities among TANF recipi-
ents, and child care is an important supportive service to help recipients
find and keep jobs. Second, some states want to increase funding for
low-income working families who were not on welfare, perhaps out of a
desire to treat welfare and nonwelfare families more equitably. Third,
some state legislatures' interest in child care has been sparked by re-
search that shows that the first three years of life are crucial in children's
14States can also transfer up to 10 percent of their TANIF block grant to the Social Services
Block Grant (SSBG), which states may use to fund child care. The total of TANF transfers to
both CCDF and SSBG cannot exceed 30 percent. In 2001, the maximum amount that states
can transfer to SSBG wifi decrease to 4.25 percent (Greenberg and Savner, 1998).Welfare Reform under PRWORA 173
brain development. Finally, the increase in federalfunds available for
child care under both CCDF and TANF created an incomeeffect.
The majority of states have chosen to use a portion oftheir TANF
block grant for child care. In 1998, 23 states and the Districtof Columbia
transferred funds from their TANF block grant to theirCCDF block
grant. In addition, 12 states spent TANFfunds directly on child care.
Seven states (California, Florida, Michigan, NorthCarolina, Oklahoma,
Vermont, and Virginia) did both. Nationwide,2.6 percent of TANF
funds were transferred to CCDF and 4.6 percent were spentdirectly on
child care.
2.2.3 Changes in Eligibility Rules for Child CareUnder PRWORA,
states have substantially more freedom todecide which lqw-income fami-
lies receive child-care subsidies. As noted earlier, states are nolonger
required to guarantee subsidies to families on or transitioningoff of cash
assistance. States are allowed, but not required, to servefamilies with
incomes up to 85 percent of state median income(SMI). This represents
an increase from the 75 percentof SMI allowed under CCDBG. How-
ever, most states setincome-eligibility limits under the maximum level
allowed by the federal government both under CCDBG andCCDF.
As under CCDBG, states can choose to allocatechild-care funds to any
family involved in work activities with a child under 13that has incomes
below the state-determined eligibility level. States continue tohave some
discretion in determining who is eligible for CCDFsubsidies, because
they can determine what qualifies as a work activity(Committee on
Ways and Means, 1996, 1998). For example, some states countattending
high school, two-year college, and/or four-year colleges as awork activ-
ity, while others do not. There is some concern that statepolicies that do
not allow college students to receive child-caresubsidies limit the ability
of parents to increase their earnings. States can also useCCDF funds to
provide child care for children in need of protective servicesbecause of
risk of abuse or neglect, regardless of family income.
States' ResponsesStates' responses to their new freedom to serve
families between 75 percent and 85 percent of SMIvaried. As reflected in
their plans for 1997_1999,15 nine states, includingAlaska, Connecticut,
Louisiana, Mississippi, and Oregon, indicated that theyplanned to avail
The federal government requires states to submit child-care plansthat outline states'
policy intentions for the upcoming two fiscal years to theAdministration for Children and
Families. The first state plans under CCDF were for the period October 1,1997 through
September 30, 1999. While these plans are not binding, they do give ageneral sense of
states' intentions.174Loprest, Schmidt & Witte
themselves of the new flexibility under CCDF and raise income eligibifity
to 85 percent of SMI. According to the plans, states set income eligibility
for child-care services from 42 percent of SMI (Missouri and Wyoming)
to 85 percent of SMI.
The diversity of state changes in income eligibility under CCDFis
illustrated in Table 1. As can be seen in this table, 10 of the 13 Assessing
the New Federalism (ANF) states raised their income-eligibility limits
under PRWORA.16 Two states (Alabama and Wisconsin) lowered their
income-eligibility limits. Four states (Colorado, Mississippi, Texas, and
Washington) raised their income-eligibility limits substantiallyenough
that the limit both as a percentage of state median income (SMI) andas a
percentage of the federal poverty level (FPL) increased (Long, Kirby,
Kurka, and Waters, 1998). On average, states raised their income eligibil-
ity limits by a little over $130, an amount large enough topreserve the
relationship between the limit and the FPL.
Interpretation of income-eligibility limits is not straightforward. Some
states set relatively high limits, but do not have funds available toserve
all families that qualify for assistance. For example, Mississippi'sin-
crease in income eligibility did not benefit many eligible low-income fami-
lies, because funding for CCDF did not allow the stateto serve all eligible
families that applied for assistance. Other states set lowerincome-
eligibility limits, but serve all eligible families (e.g., Wisconsin andIllinois
after PRWORA). States sometimes lower their income-eligibility limitsto
get rid of waiting lists.
2.2.4 Whom to Serve?How StatesAllocate Child-Care ResourcesUnder
the CCDF, states have broad flexibility in deciding which low-income
families receive child-care subsidies. Statesmay choose to provide a guar-
antee of subsidies to eligible low-income families, or theymay give prior-
ity for subsidies to certain groups of the eligible population.
PRWORA requires that states give the highest priority for child-care
subsidies to very low-income families and to children with special needs.
However, states decide what level of income constitutesvery low in-
come and what constitutes a special need (Department of Health and
Human Services, 1998a).
The legislation provides incentives for states to continue to give priority
for child care to families on or transitioning off cash assistance.TANF
regulations indicate that states cannot sanction parents of children under
age 6 who carmot find suitable child care (Greenberg and Savner, 1998).
6 These data are from in-depthcase studies of welfare and child-care programs conducted
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Families newly applying for TANF subsidies are also often given prior-
ity for child-care subsidies in order to keep them from entering the
TANF rolls. This priority for subsidies is an important element in the
diversion programs discussed in the previous section.
There is some empirical evidence that providing child-care subsidies
increases the number of TANF recipients who work and help other work-
ing-poor families to remain independent. Chipty, Witte, and Queralt
(1999), Lemke et al. (1999), and Queralt, Witte, and Griesinger (1999) find
that families on cash assistance have significantly higher probabilities of
work and significantly higher earnings when child-care subsidies are
more generously funded. Witte, Queralt, Chipty and Griesinger (1999)
report that both former recipients of cash assistance and other low-income
families eligible for child-care subsidies have higher earnings when fund-
ing for child-care subsidies is more generous.
States' ResponsesStates have responded in a variety of ways to their
new flexibility in deciding which families receive child-care subsidies.
According to state plans, all but four states have established definitions
of very low income that are below their standard income-eligibility level.
Definitions of very low income ranged from around $1,500 below the
standard income-eligibility limit (for Georgia) to almost $26,000 below
that limit (North Dakota). Three states (Alabama, Florida, and North
Carolina) specifically indicated that very low income was equal to their
standard income-eligibility level (Administration for Children and Fami-
lies, 1998a).
In practice, some states that defined very low income as below their
standard income-eligibility limit do not give very low-income families
priority, and some states that have definitions of very low income equal
to their standard income-eligibility limit give priority to lower income
groups.
Consistent with incentives under PRWORA, most states give priority
to families with some connection to the TANF system. In 1997, most
ANF states gave welfare recipients highest priority for receiving child-
care subsidies. Families transitioning off welfare were often given sec-
ond priority. At least four ANF states (California, Florida, New Jersey,
and Texas) have extended the period of child-care subsidy eligibility
beyond the 12-month period mandated under the TCC program (Long,
Kirby, Kurka, and Waters, 1998; Witte, Queralt, Chipty and Griesinger,
1999). State child-care administrators in some of the ANF states said
that they were hesitant to expand funding beyond the welfare popula-
tion because they were concerned about an increase in demand for
child care among families on welfare and transitioning off welfare, espe-Welfare Reform under PRWORA 177
cially families with very young children (Long (1999) and Long and
Clark, (1998)).
In many states, low-income working families who are not on cash
assistance receive the lowest priority for child-care subsidies. Such fami-
lies are often placed on waiting lists or simply do not apply for subsidies.
Waiting lists for child-care assistance are quite long in some states. In
late 1997, California had over 200,000 low-income families waiting for
child-care subsidies. Most of these families were neither current nor
former recipients of cash assistance (U.S. General Accounting Office,
1998a). However, the increases in both state and federal child-care fund-
ing under PRWORA have allowed many states to decrease their waiting
lists. At least four states, Michigan, Oklahoma, Vermont, and Washing-
ton, currently have no waiting list for subsidies.
In a more radical departure from the pre-PRWORA system, four states
have severed the link between child-care subsidies and cash assistance.
These states have guaranteed child-care assistance to all qualifying low-
income families, regardless of welfare status. Three of these states (Colo-
rado, Illinois, and Wisconsin) have decreased income-eligibility limits and
increased funding for child care in order to be able to guarantee subsidies.
The fourth state, Rhode Island, has chosen an even more dramatic break
with pre-PRWORA programs. It both guaranteed comprehensive child-
care services to all low-income families and increased its income-eligibility
limit. To acconunodate these changes, the State nearly tripled its spend-
ing for child-care services between SFY 1996 and SFY 2000.
2.2.5 Benefit LevelsThe two major state policies affecting the level of
benefits a family receives from child-care subsidies are: (1) the prices paid
by the state to providers for child-care services, called reimbursement
rates; and (2) the schedule that lays out the portion of child-care costs that
family must pay, called the copayment schedule or the sliding-fee scale.
The level of benefits a family receives from child-care subsidies also de-
pends upon their situation (e.g., number of children, age of children,
income), the type of child care used, and the state child-care policy. All
other things equal, a family with younger children and more children
receiving subsidized care wifi receive higher benefits from a child-care
subsidy program. This is true because the price of child care is higher for
younger children. Families with children in center care receive higher
benefits than families using other types of care. This is true because center
care is generally more expensive than family child-care homes (FCCHs),
which in turn are generally more expensive than informal care.'7
17See Horrace, Schmidt, and Witte (1998) for detailed information on prices of child care.178Loprest, Schmidt & Witte
State Reimbursement RatesUnder CCDBG child-care subsidy pro-
grams and now under CCDF programs, states are required to set up
programs that maximize parental choice. Parents must be given the
option of receiving a certificate (voucher) that can be used to purchase
child-care services from either formal (including sectarian) or informal
sources (e.g., a relative). In states that contract directly with providers,
parents must also be given the option of using a state-contracted pro-
vider. Although not well known, under CCDBG the United States has
been experimenting with a voucher system for the purchase of child-care
services since 1992. Vouchers for elementary and secondary education
remain controversial, but vouchers for preschool and after-school care
are not only accepted, but also required by the federal government.
For both child-care certificates and contracts with child-care providers,
states must decide the amount to pay various types of providers (e.g., in-
home, family child-care homes, centers) for various types of services
(e.g., care for children of different ages). Under the pre-PRWORA, IV-A
child-care programs, states were allowed to pay providers up to the 75th
percentile of the local market rate for the type of care being provided.18
States were required to conduct market-rate surveys every two years to
determine the 75th percentiles of market prices.19 However, the Adminis-
tration for Children and Families (ACF) did not enforce this requirement.
Unlike the Title TV-A child-care programs, the CCDBG did not limit
state payments to providers to the 75th percentile of market prices for
care (Long, Kirby, Kurka, and Waters, 1998). State payments to provid-
ers had to be sufficient to ensure "equal access" to child care for eligible
children. In practice, most states used the same reimbursement rates for
their Title TV-A and CCDBG child-care programs. However, some used
the rate flexibility under CCDBG to develop their own policies.20
Since PRWORA, requirements for payments to providers mix aspects
18The 75th percentile emerged as the maximum allowable reimbursement rate as a compro-
mise. Some policymakers felt that the median should be the maximum reimbursement rate
allowed, while others felt that poor children should be able to access all care in the commu-
nity. The latter group argued that poor children need the highest-quality and most compre-
hensive child care in order to overcome their financial and other home disadvantages.
19Some states (e.g., Florida, Massachusetts) do not allow providers to charge subsidized
parents a fee over and above the state reimbursement rate. In these states, the reimburse-
ment rate sets the upper limit for the price of care that can be chosen. Other states, like
Alabama, allow providers to charge families more than the reimbursement rate, so families
may have additional fees beyond their copayment.
20For example, under its CCDBG program, California reimbursed providers at rates that
exceeded the 75th percentile of market prices if the provider charged private clients rates
that exceeded the 75th percentile. Under CCDF, the state has expanded this policy to all
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of the system formally used for the Title TV-A programswith CCDBG's
requirement that state reimbursement rates be sufficient toprovide
equal access to child-care services. Under CCDF regulations, states are
required to provide a summary of the facts that they rely onwhen
setting reimbursement rates. The facts supplied mustinclude a descrip-
tion of how adequate rates are to allow subsidized familiesequal access
to child care. The state must demonstrate thatsubsidized families have
equal access using data from a local market-rate surveyconducted no
earlier than two years prior to the effective date of the state'sCCDF plan.
Reimbursement rates at or above the 75th percentile ofmarket prices for
care are presumed to provideequal access.
State and Federal ResponsesSince PRWORA, some states and ACF
have altered some aspects of their reimbursement-ratepolicies. Many
states now pay different providers different ratesdepending on the
quality or type of care they provide. At least in some areasof the coun-
try, ACF is refusing to approve a state'sCCDF plan for 1999-2001 if the
state has not carried out a market-rate survey duringthe last two years.
At last count, 17 states had tiered reimbursement ratesthat paid differ-
ent rates to different types of providers. For example,Nebraska pays up
to the 90th percentile of the market ratefor accredited care, and only up
to the 75th percentile for nonaccreditedcare.21 South Carolina has a
three-tier reimbursement system that reimbursesaccredited providers
$10 more per week than providers that simply meet statelicensing stan-
dards. Mississippi pays higher rates to providers that meetaccreditation
standards, have at least one person with an associate orbachelor's de-
gree in ECE or a Child DevelopmentAssociate (CDA) certificate, and
provide at least one of the following services: transportation,sick-child
care, weekend care, 24-hour care,holiday care, or expansion of care to
full-day services (APWA, 1988). Oklahoma provides athree-tier reim-
bursement rate with the top rate paid for services in licensedand accred-
ited child-care facilities that employ qualified directors andteachers,
provide higher staff compensation levels, and encourageparental in-
volvement (APWA, 1998). See Azer (1999) for details regardingdifferen-
tial reimbursement rates.
Under CCDF, most states continue to rely on market-rate surveysbut,
at least until this fall, did not conduct market-rate surveysfrequently. In
their 1997 CCDF plans, 96% of state CCDF plans indicatedthat they
planned to rely on market-rate surveys to set reimbursement rates.But
21The most important accrediting body for child care is the NationalAssociation for the
Education of Young Children (NAEYC).180Loprest, Schmidt & Witte
in 1998, only a minority of states (16) based their reimbursement rateson
surveys that were less than two years old (Adams, Schulman, and Ebb,
1998). During the last two years, many states have conducted market-
rate surveys, and more are currently conducting such surveys in order to
obtain ACF's approval of their 1999-2001 CCDF plans. Accordingto
their 1997 state plans, 50 percent of states reported that they reimbursed
providers at rates up to the 75th percentile of market price for at least
some types of care.
Reflecting both old market-rate surveys and reimbursement rates be-
low the 75th percentile of market prices, reimbursement rates for child
care continued to be low in most states under PRWORA. For example,
according to states' 1997-1999 CCDF plans, the maximum reimburse-
ment rate for full-time care in a licensed or registered center fora pre-
school child (generally 3-5 years old) ranged from $55per week in West
Virginia to $200 per week in Nevada and Wisconsin. Thirty-four states,
including Illinois, Maryland, Ohio, and Oregon, hada maximum reim-
bursement rates for full-time preschool center care thatwas below $100
per week. The median of state maximum reimbursement rate for full-
time center care for preschoolers was $83.70 per week, and the 75th
percentile was $107 per week.
As of late 1997, seven of the thirteen ANF states had respondedto
PRWORA by increasing their reimbursement rates in real terms forcen-
ters and family child-care homes, two states held their rates constant for
both types of care, two states decreased their rates for both types ofcare,
and two states increased the reimbursement rates for centercare and
decreased them for family child-care homes (see Table 2).
Family PaymentsThe 1996 welfare reform legislation gave states more
uniform guidelines for setting the families' share of child-carecosts. The
parental program is referred to as the copayment, since thestate pays a
portion of the cost of care and the family pays the rest.
Prior to PRWORA, the federal government had varying requirements
regarding copayments. States were not allowed to charge working
AFDC recipients or JOBS participants copayments for child-care subsi-
dies. By way of contrast, states were required to chargecopayments to
families that received subsidies under the At-Risk and the TCCpro-
grams. States were permitted, but not required, to charge copayments to
families receiving subsidies under the CCDBG.
Under CCDF, states may charge all families copayments for childcare,
and the copayments may be set at any level. Statesmay exempt from
copayments families with incomes at or below 100 percent of the federal
poverty line and families with children needing protective services. AllWelfare Reform under PRWORA 181
TABLE 2
Maximum Reimbursement Before and After PRWORA
Preschoolers
other families are required to contribute to the cost of care (Office of the
Inspector General, 1998).
States' ResponsesStates have given varied responses to their addi-
tional freedom in deciding which families wifi be required to make
copayments for child care. According to state plans, eleven states (e.g.,
Arkansas, California, Delaware, South Dakota, and Vermont) plan to
require no copayments from families at or below poverty. Eight states
(e.g., the District of Columbia, Florida, Illinois, New Jersey, South Caro-
lina, and Washington) have moved towards more imiform copayment
schedules across different groups of subsidy recipients, requiring all
families to make copayments.The remaining states plan to require
some, but not all, families in poverty to make copayments.
2.2.6 Devolution? Under PRWORA, a number of states have given lo-
cal government the power to make child-care policy. For example, under
its recently passed School Readiness Legislation, Florida has devolved
both policymaking and administrative responsibility for all child-care
subsidy programs and Early Childhood Education [e.g., Head Start and
Pre-Kindergarten (Pre-K) programs] to local boards. These boards wifi
Requiring families whose children are in protective care to make copayments has proven
administratively difficult, at least in some states.
Center Family Day Care
State'94-'96'97-'99Change (%)'94-'96'97-'99Change (%)
AL $59.28 $70.00 18.08 $56.73 $60.00 5.76
CA $97.73$113.95 16.60 $93.53$102.19 9.26
CO $82.69 $75.34 -8.89 $72.69 $69.55 -4. 32
FL $68.02 $77.10 13.35 $72.61 $79.87 10.00
MA $146.87$135.71 -7.60 $99.76 $97.03 -2.74
MI $65.62 $65.52 -0.15 $61.72 $61.72 0.00
MN $88.03$108.06 22.75 $71.78 $87.18 21.45
MS $60.00 $65.00 8.33 $50.00 $35.00 -30.00
NJ $196.75$101.80 -48.26 $196.75 $76.40 -61.17
NY $113.19$130.42 15.22 $85.47$101.44 18.68
TX $67.51 $75.36 11.63 $58.15 $64.81 11.45
WA $81.04 $36.17 -55.37 $79.00 $33.67 - 57.38
WI $80.57$110.68 37.37 $80.57$105.55 31.00182Loprest, Schmidt & Witte
determine eligibility standards, reimbursement rates, and copayment
schedules. Texas moved child-care policymaking to the local level on
September 1, 1999.
Extensive federal reporting requirements under PRWORA provide a
potentially countervailing centralizing force. The reporting requirements
have forced states to standardize child-care management information
systems across local subsidy management agencies. The required re-
ports provide both the state and the federal government with more
complete, timely, and extensive information on how child-care subsidy
dollars are spent and what type of families are served. The reports pro-
vide the opportunity for increased scrutiny of child-care programs by the
state and federal governments. At this point, it is not clear how either
the states or the federal government will actually use the information
that is being collected.
2.2.7 Administrative ConsolidationPrior to PRWORA, child-care poi-
icy tended to be fragmented, with child-care assistance for current and
former AFDC recipients often separated from child-care assistance for
the working poor. PRWORA allowed, but did not require, states to
consolidate their cash-assistance and working-poor child-care programs.
States may also establish a uniform set of policies for all child-care sub-
sidy programs.
Before 1996, many states had different policies and procedures, and
different offices for families receiving cash assistance and working poor
families. For example, Long, Kirby, Kurka, and Waters (1998) found that
only six of the thirteen ANF states had a single point of entry for all
applicants for child care. As families' economic circumstances changed,
they often lost one source of funding for subsidies and experienced
delays in obtaining subsidies under another program.
In states with fragmented administrative systems, obtaining access to
child-care assistance was a difficult and time-consuming process. Fami-
lies would often have to apply for assistance with multiple agencies and
place their names on multiple waiting lists if subsidized care was not
available. In Massachusetts, parents could apply for a voucher at their
local child-care resource and referral agency or for care at any number of
child-care providers with whom the state contracted. The resource and
referral agency and the contracted providers all kept separate waiting
lists, leading some parents to place their names on multiple lists, hoping
for a slot. After a careful study of pre-PRWORA child-care programs, the
U.S. General Accounting Office (1994) concluded that "the fragmented
nature of the child care funding streams, with entitlements to someWelfare Reform under PRWORA 183
client categories, time limits on others, and activity limits on still others,
produces unintended gaps in services which limit the ability of low-
income families to achieve self-sufficiency."
States' ResponsesSince PRWORA, some states have consolidated the
administration of child-care subsidy programs, while other states have
yet to make major changes in their pre-PRWORA child-care assistance
programs. In 1997, all four of the ANF states (California, Massachusetts,
New Jersey, and Washington) that did not have consolidated central
administrations prior to PRWORA planned to consolidate administra-
tion of all CCDF funding streams (Long, Kirby, Kurka, and Waters,
1998). Massachusetts administrators credited PRWORA with serving as
a catalyst for change within their child-care system. Someof these states
still have separate programs for different types of subsidy receipts.
Some states have gone further. For example, both North Carolina and
Rhode Island have created state-level councils to coordinate policy and
organize support for child-care services (the North Carolina Interagency
Coordinating Council and Rhode Island's Children's Cabinet).
Centralizing the administrative functions of programs is one step to-
wards consolidating the fragmented child-care system. It does not, how-
ever, guarantee that families wifi no longer face varyingpolicies and
procedures, have different points of entry into the system, or be placed
on multiple waiting lists. Some states are making the integrationof their
child-care systems a priority, going beyond consolidation of program
administration. New Jersey reports that since PRWORA it has not only
consolidated program administration, but also now presents all families
that apply for subsidized care with a single set of policies and proce-
dures. Other states still maintain unconsolidated local systems with vary-
ing policies and procedures and multiple points of entry for application.
Welfare reform has also encouraged states to better coordinate their
CCDF child-care programs with their Early Childhood Education (ECE)
programs. Prior to PRWORA, many ECE programs (e.g., Head Startand
Pre-K) served the children of nonworking AFDC recipients for part of
the day and part of the year. Part-year, part-day child-care programs are
not well suited to the needs of working TANF recipients.
State can better utilize both child-care subsidies and ECE programs if
they use child-care subsidies to do such things as extend the hours of
care available in ECE programs. CCDF funds are also frequentlyused to
provide care that picks up when ECE programs close. For example,
Florida requires its child-care subsidy program to be coordinated with
ECE programs and establishes a single administration for all programs.184Loprest, Schmidt & Witte
As part of administrative consolidation, the state requires a single wait-
ing list for child-care subsidies and ECE programs, and requires the
programs to meet specified goals regarding school readiness.
3. CHANGES IN INCENTIVES FOR FAMILIES AND
THEIR RESPONSE
In addition to providing income support, a goal of welfare policy has
long been to influence the behavior of recipients, sometimes in an at-
tempt to undo the disincentives inherent in any welfare program. As
noted earlier, when passing PRWORA, Congress explicitly sought to
promote job preparedness, employment, and marriage and to discour-
age out-of-wedlock births. It also gave states the flexibility to develop
child-care programs that best suit the needs of children and parents
within each state.
In this section we wifi discuss how recent changes in the structure of
welfare programs, under waivers and post-PRWORA, have changed
incentives for families in the areas of employment and program participa-
tion, and what we know about how families have responded.23
3.1 Incentives Affecting Employment
Many of the recent changes to welfare are designed to increase incen-
tives to work. At the same time, other policy changes have also in-
creased the financial return to work, providing further work incentives.
The changes in policies affecting work can be grouped into three types:
financial incentives to work, subsidies for work-related expenses, and
mandatory work requirements coupled with benefit sanctions for failure
to comply.
3.1.1 Financial Incentives As described earlier, a majority of states
have increased financial incentives to work through more generous earn-
ings disregards. These policies allow recipients to keep a greater propor-
tion of their earnings while continuing to receive some benefits, thus
lowering the implicit tax rate on earnings for beneficiaries.
Some research has addressed the effect of financial incentives on em-
ployment and earnings, including a number of experimental design eval-
uations of specific state programs. For a review see Blank, Card, and
n Moffitt (1992) provides a review of a variety of incentive effects of the pre-reform welfare
system. Changes in welfare programs such as greater eligibility for two-parent families,
family caps, and teen residency requirements also potentially affect incentives for marriage
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Robins (1999). In general, financial incentives of this type have been
found to increase employment and earnings of recipients, but usually
with increased program costs and sometimes without increasing overall
incomes of recipients.
Additional financial incentives outside the welfare system also serve
to increase work incentives for recipients. One of the most important of
these factors was the expansion of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC)
in 1994 and the indexing of benefit levels for inflation. This program
works like a negative income tax by providing a refundable tax credit to
working families below a certain income level. Given the structure of the
tax credit, the marginal tax rate on additional earnings varies. For wel-
fare recipients who are not working or working few hours, the EITC
substantially increases the financial returns to work (Acs, Coe, Watson,
and Lerman, 1998). Several studies have shown relatively large impacts
of increases in the EITC on the labor supply of single women (Eissa and
Liebman 1996; Meyer and Rosenbaum, 1999). Recent work has shown
significant effect of EITC on wages and the probability that current and
former welfare recipients will work (Lemke et al., 1999; Queralt, Witte,
and Griesinger, 1999).
Increases in the minimum wage in 1996 and 1997 also may have in-
creased work among welfare beneficiaries, many of whom have low skill
levels so that the minimum wage is binding on them. However, mini-
mum-wage increases can also potentially decrease demandfor low-
skilled labor.
The expansion of child-care subsidies and the changes in child-care
policy under PRWORA mean that it is no longer possible to analyze
employment incentives of low-income families with children without
considering the copayments that families are required to make for child
care. One important policy change in many states has been to charge
some or all current and former TANF recipients copayments whenthey
receive child-care subsidies. These copayments wifi partly offset the ef-
fects of increased earnings disregards.
As far as we are aware, Acs et al. (1998) provide the most comprehen-
sive analysis of the combined impact of a wide array of social welfare
programs, including child-care subsidy programs, on the work incen-
tives of low-income families. They find that work incentives in the 12
ANF states increased substantially after PRWORA. The level of increase
in incentives varied substantially with the level of earnings and the level
of child-care costs borne by the family.
For example, Acs et al. find that a single TANF mother with two
children, one of whom requires full-time child care, would experience a
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to part-time minimum-wage work, a moderate increase in income as she
moved from part-time to full-time minimum-wage work, and a relatively
low increase in income as she moved from full-time minimum-wage
work to full-time work at $9 per hour. To be more specific, assuming that
the mother required full-time paid care for one of her two children and
received a subsidy for that care, the family's monthly total income would
rise between 36 percent (in California) and 84 percent (in Alabama) as
the mother moved from unemployment to part-time minimum-wage
work. The family's monthly total income would rise between 17 percent
(in Colorado) and 33 percent (in Alabama) as the mother moved from
part-time to full-time work paying the minimum wage. Most of these
increases in family income are a result of the EITC. Finally, as the mother
moved to a full-time job paying $9 per hour, total family income would
increase between 1 percent (in Massachusetts) and 19 percent (in Ala-
bama). The more modest increases in income as the mother moves into a
higher-paying job reflects the phase-out of both state and federal EITC
and, in some states, copayments for child care that rise rapidly as family
income increases.
3.1.2 Subsidized Work Expenses As part of their TANF programs,
many states provide subsidies for work-related expenses. This decreases
the cost of work, at least over the term of the subsidy, and thus increases
the financial returns to work. While the type and extent of these subsi-
dies varies across programs, they typically include in-kind or cash bene-
fits for transportation costs, uniforms and tools, and even licensing.
Some of the most important work subsidy benefits are for child care and
health insurance while working.
Potentially the most important work subsidy for welfare recipients is
for child care. Poor families who do not receive child-care subsidies
spend a substantial portion of their income on child care. In 1993, the
39 percent of poor families with preschoolers who paid for child care
spent an average of 25 percent of their monthly family income on it
(Casper, 1995). Acs et al. (1998) provide a vivid picture of the effect on
earnings of child care costs and how subsidies can dilute it.
As noted earlier, most states, but not all, give priority for receiving
child-care subsidies to welfare recipients and families who recently left
welfare. Families who receive child-care subsidies either paya much
smaller share of their income in child-care expenses or receive what
they perceive to be better care for their children. In January 1998,a
family of three earning income equal to the federal poverty level in 1997
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income in California to 12 percent in North Dakota (Adams, Schulman,
and Ebb, 1998).24
Another provision of most TANF programs that can reduce the im-
plicit tax on work for welfare recipients is the provision of transitional
Medicaid health-insurance benefits. Transitional Medicaid benefits typi-
cally continue health-insurance coverage for working former recipient
families for a year or more after leaving welfare. Without these provi-
sions, recipients who worked at a level that makes them no longer
eligible for welfare benefits would also lose Medicaid benefits. Expan-
sions to the Medicaid program in the late 1980s and early 1990s already
made it possible for many children to retain coverage at family income
levels above the AFDC eligibility line. However, these expansions did
not include adults. Given that many working low-income familiesdo not
get health insurance through their employer (either because itis not
offered, because they are not eligible, or because of high participation
costs), transitional Medicaid benefits should increase the incentive to
work. Yelowitz (1995) found that the Medicaid expansions had a positive
effect on the labor supply of previously married women but no effect on
never-married women.
3.1.3 Mandatory Work RequirementsFinancial incentives can change
the marginal benefit of a first or additional hour of work. Mandatory work
requirements, coupled with benefit sanctions for failure to meet these
requirements, also increase the marginal benefit of work (or participation
in other work-related activities) by decreasing the value of the alternative
(not participating). As discussed earlier, many states have increased their
initial sanctions for noncompliance, some even reducing benefits to zero.
Some recipients are exempt from work requirements, so this incentive
depends on the characteristics of the recipient and her family.
3.2 Incentives Affecting Participation
In one sense, program changes that increase the incentive to work also
serve to decrease participation for those receivingwelfare, because as
earnings reach a certain level a recipient wifi no longer be eligible to exit
the program. However, increases in earnings disregards allow recipients
to earn more and continue to receive welfare, thus prolongingthe dura-
tion of welfare receipt. There are some additional facets of recent reform
that also can affect the probability of participation in TANF. These ef-
fects may be both intended and unintended consequences of these poli-
24 The families may have additional costs on top of their copayments.188Loprest, Schmidt & Witte
cies. The most important changes include the introduction of benefit
time limits, changes in the "environment" of welfare (including theex-
tent of requirements and the culture of welfare programs), and access to
child-care subsidies.
While there has been little research yet on the extent to which specific
changes have affected participation, there have been several studies
trying to explain the recent caseload declines more broadly. These stud-
ies use time-series caseload data to investigate the effects of policy,
without separating entry and exit effects or specific policy changes
(Council of Economic Advisors, 1997; R. Blank, 1997). The studies find
that welfare waivers (combining all types of policy changes) causeda
significant decline in caseloads. Moffitt (1999) finds similar results but
goes on to use micro-level data to examine the effect of waivers on labor
supply, earnings, and income, finding that waivers led to increased
weeks worked and hours, but not to increased earnings orwages. At-
tempts in these studies to separate out the effect of specific types of
waiver policies, such as family caps vs. time limits, have been inconclu-
sive. In their most recent study, the Council of Economic Advisorsuses
caseload data for 1976 through 1998 to sort out the relative importance of
the strong economy and welfare reform for the decline in caseloads since
1994. They conclude that most of the decline in caseloads that occurred
for 1993-1996 was due to the strong economy. However, they feel that
roughly one-third of the decline from 1996 to 1998 was due to welfare
reform (Council of Economic Advisors, 1999).
3.2.1 Time LimitsReducing the lifetime allowable months of benefit
receipt (and/or months of receipt within a certain time period) provides an
incentive for recipients to leave welfare sooner than they would have
otherwise and decreases the incentive to participate overall. Given a un-ut
on total months of receipt, a recipient deciding to continue receiving
TANF next month wifi have one less month of potential TANF benefits in
the future. Before time limits, recipients would compare the present dis-
counted value of potential income streams with and without continuing
benefit receipt next month. After time limits, future benefit receipt isnow
lower if benefits are continued, which decreases the present discounted
value of that income stream, decreasing the probability of welfare receipt
next month. For recipients who expect to need cash assistance in the
future, the probability of continuing benefit receipt is unambiguously
lower when there are time limits than in a no-time-limits world. The
extent to which time limits affect participation depends on many factors,
including how families view their chances of exhausting benefits, their
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3.2.2 Changes in Program "Environment" As describedearlier, many
state TANF programs have increased activityrequirements for benefit
receipt over those for AFDC. The JOBS program hadjob preparedness
requirements for some recipients, but most TANF programshave in-
creased activity requirements far beyond those under theJOBS program.
States have increased the number of hours of requiredactivities. They
have also restricted the choice of activities, andincreased the pooi of
recipients required to be active. In addition,non-work-related require-
ments have increased substantially. Some of theseinclude immuniza-
tion and school attendance for children, fingerprintingof recipients,
more frequent recertifications of exemptions,and stricter paternity estab-
lishment rules.
The environment and culture of many welfare offices haschanged.
PRWORA stresses the idea that both parties (the governmentand the
recipient) have responsibilities. As noted earlier, most states now re-
quire recipients to sign some form of personalresponsibility plan that
emphasizes that welfare receipt is a contract: benefits areprovided in
return for the recipient's pledge to carry outcertain activities. For
some, the increase in required activitychanges their valuation of bene-
fit receipt enough for them to end welfare receipt or not beginparticipa-
tion. Diversion policies that require applicants toperform job search
before being eligible may also deter potential applicantsfrom joining
the program.
Edin and Lein (1997) document extensive "off-the-books"work done
by welfare recipients. Such work may well conflictwith the now higher
participation requirements and lead recipients to leavewelfare.
3.2.3 Access to Child-Care SubsidiesAs discussed earlier, in some, but
not all, states, families face an important incentive to enterwelfarethe
receipt of priority for child-care subsidies. As notedearlier, many states
have waiting lists for child-care subsidies for familieswho did not re-
ceive cash assistance. In such states, some parentsfrustrated by long
waiting lists may join the welfare rolls to get child-careassistance. This
could also be true for some other forms of work assistance,but likely to a
lesser extent, since other benefits such as educationand training assis-
tance or Medicaid coverage are morewidely available to low-income
families that do not receive cash assistance.
An important potential side benefit of programssuch as those in Colo-
rado, Illinois, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin that severthe link between
cash assistance and priority for child care is to decreasethe incentive to
participate in the TANF program. One could also,of course, argue for
breaking the link on equity grounds.190Loprest, Schmidt & Witte
3.3 Trying to Sort It All Out
Researchers are only now beginning to try to sort out the independent
effects of the different policy changes that have accompaniedPRWORA
on the employment and earnings of low-income families. Devolution,
when coupled with the increasing diversity of state and localprograms,
means that such efforts require not only longitudinal data that span a
period before and after welfare reform, but also detailed local-level policy
and administrative information. The wide variety of policy and adminis-
trative changes means that such work needs to be unusually comprehen-
sive in its inclusion of policy and administrative variables.
As far as we are aware, there are currently results for only four studies
that use data for both a period prior to and one after welfare reform and
that take into account a wide range of changes associated with welfare
reform (Chipty, Witte, and Queralt, 1999; Lemke et al., 1999; Queralt,
Witte, and Griesinger, 1999; Witte, Queralt, Chipty, and Griesinger,
1999). These studies use large samples of child-care subsidy recipientsin
Massachusetts, a state that began welfare reform prior to PRWORA, and
Florida, a state that implemented welfare reform immediately after
PRWORA became effective. The studies consider the effects ofa wide
array of cash-assistance and child-care policy and administrative changes
that accompanied welfare reform, the effect of two minimumwage in-
creases, the effect of the increased generosity of the EITC, and the effect of
tax credits for hiring current and former welfare recipients. They also
control for an unusually wide array of personal and family characteristics
and for the nature of the local labor and child-care markets.
Overall, these studies, when coupled with other work,suggest the
following tentative conclusions. Increased funding for child-care subsi-
dies and the increased generosity of the EITCare most consistently
related to increases in the probability of work and earnings forcurrent
and former welfare recipients and for other low-income familieswith
children. High levels and rates of increase incopayments for child-care
subsidies may well have significant work disincentive effects. Bothtime
limits and activity requirements are associated with significantincreases
in the probability that a welfare recipient wifi work, butare also associ-
ated with significantly lower wages for those that do work. Thislatter
effect may result because families have lower reservationwages when
faced with time limits or activity requirements. Increasesin the mini-
mum wage, sanctions, and employer tax credits for hiring low-income
workers may have no significant effecton either the probability of work
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3.4 Child-Care Choice
One of the main objectives of federal child-care subsidy policy is togive
families a choice of child-care arrangements. This objective wascodified
in the final CCDF regulations. Whether a policyexpands someone's
choices is empirically difficult to measure, since all one sees isthe
arrangement actually chosen and not the range of choicesthe parent
faces. One way of looking at the effect of subsidies on the rangeof
choices is to see if there are systematic differences inthe arrangements
chosen by families who use subsidies and those who do not.A problem
with this approach is that families who use subsidies may bedifferent
in other ways (e.g., preferences for child care) thanfamilies who do not
receive subsidies. Fuller et al. (1999) find that familieswho use subsi-
dies are more likely to use center-based care than otherfamilies. Given
that the overwhelming majority of copayment schedules arebased on
gross family income and family size, parentswith a subsidy face the
same price for all types of care.Faced with the same price for all types
of care, it is not too surprising that subsidized families are morelikely
to choose center care, which is generallybelieved to be of higher quality
on average.
4. RESULTS FROM THE NATIONAL SURVEYOF
AMERICA'S FAMILIES
As welfare reform and a booming labor market have led to a dramaticdrop
in the number of families on welfare, there is great interestin how families
who have left the welfare rolls are faring. In this section, we present
results from the National Survey of America's Families (NSAF)that pro-
vide a national picture of work and child-care use among formerwelfare
recipients in 1997, the early period after the passage ofPRWORA.25
There is also a great deal of concern about the effects of welfare reform
on children. As more single mothersbecome employed due to welfare
reform, it is likely that more children will be cared for by someone other
than their mothers. Over half (56 percent) of employed formerwelfare
recipients have at least one child under the age of five.A first step in
understanding how welfare reform is affecting children is to know who
cares for them. In this section, we describehow young children of em-
A large number of studies have provided descriptive information on formerrecipients'
status in particular parts of the country at the state or local level.For reviews see Brauner
and Loprest (1999) or U.S. General Accounting Office (1999).192Loprest, Schmidt & Witte
ployed former welfare recipients are cared for, and howcare for these
children differs from the care received by other low-income children.
The NSAF is a nationally representative survey of the civilian, noninsti-
tutionalized population under age 65 and their families. Interviewswere
conducted between February and November 1997. Thesurvey collected
economic, health, and social characteristics for 44,000 households,over
sampling households with incomes under 200 percent of poverty and
households in each of 13 ANF states. The 1997 NSAF provides informa-
tion for the early period of welfare reform, whensome states were well
into their reforms while other states had only just begun. A second
cross-sectional wave of the survey is being conducted in 1999.
4.1 Employment and Earnings of Welfare Leavers
With the NSAF data, we are able to examine the status of former welfare
recipients in 1997.26 The sample of 1,289 familieson which we focus
consists of former recipients who stopped receiving benefits atsome
point between 1995 and 1997 and are not receiving benefits at the time of
the interview. While this analysis combines leavers who left only several
months ago with those who left more thana year ago, separately the
sample size for either one of these groups alone becomes small.27
4.1.1 Employment of Former Recipients A first piece of evidence about
the role of work in leavers' transition off welfare is thereasons they give
for leaving. The NSAF data give us the leavers'own reports of why they
left welfare. Work is the most commonreason among this group of
leavers.28 More than two-thirds (69 percent) reported leaving welfare
because of increased earnings or hours on an ongoing jobor because of a
new job. The second most common reason for leaving, reported by 10
percent of leavers, was administrative problems or hassles.
While these results are not strictly comparable to past researchon
reasons for leaving welfare, they suggest that a higher percentage of
recipients are leaving for work now than in the past. Pavetti (1993) found
that 46 percent of recipients left welfare due toan increase in earnings.
A full description of the well-being of former welfare recipientscan be found in Loprest
(1999).
27The NSAF questions about current and former welfare receipt are asked of the adult in
the family who is most knowledgeable about the children. A small number of fathersare
included.
Survey respondents gave open-ended answers that were then coded into categories.
Leavers could report multiple reasons for leaving, but only about 5 percent did. This
description of reasons for leaving excludes about 30 percent of leavers who did notreport a
reason.TABLE 3
Job Characteristics of Those Currently Working
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Source: Urban Institute calculations from the National Survey of America'sFamilies.
Low-income mothers include women with children under 18 who have notreceived welfare
benefits since 1995 and have family incomes in 1996 under 200 percentof poverty.
Significant difference from former recipients at the 90% confidence level.
Asked only of two-parent families with both working and a child under 13 yearsold. Numbers
may not add to 100 percent due to rounding or in some cases asmall percentage of "don't know" or
"refuse" answers.
This percentage leaving for work is, in turn,higher than results for
earlier periods (Ellwood, 1986).29
A majority of former recipients were working atthe time of the inter-
view in 1997. Sixty-one percent of leavers who werestill off welfare at
the time of the interview were working. Another 16 percent were ac-
tively looking for work. Since a third of former recipientsreported living
with a spouse or partner, the number of former recipientfamilies with a
working adult is even higher. Three-quarters of formerrecipients are in
families where either they or their partner was working.Most employed
former recipients were working full time. Sixty-nine percentof former
recipients with jobs were working 35 or more hours aweek (Table 3).
Employed former recipients' jobs are best characterized asentry-level.
Only 23 percent have health insurance through theiremployer. Also,
29The data used in Pavetti (1993) differ in many ways from the NSAF, socomparisons
must be made with caution. The Ellwood study found an evenlower percentage of recipi-
ents leaving due to work than did Pavetti. Some of thisdifference is due to actual increases
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more than a quarter work mostly on night shifts (outside of the hours of
6 A. M. to p.M.). Of two-parent families where bothare working and have
a child under 13, 62 percent are coordinating their schedules for child-
care reasons. In addition, 8 percent of former recipients are holding
more than one job.
Most former recipients work in low-wage jobs. The median hourly
wage of former recipients (excluding the self-employed) in 1997 is $6.61.
While this is higher than the minimumwage of $4.75 (at the time of the
interview), it is still only roughly the 20th percentile of hourlywages for
all hourly workers. So while many former recipientsare working, they
are entering at the low end of the labor market.
Former recipients' hourly wages do not give the whole pictureof fami-
lies' reliance on work. Combining the earnings of formerrecipients with
their spouses' earnings, we find median monthly earnings for former
recipient families of $1,149 per month. On an annualized basis, this level
of median monthly earnings is $13,788, roughly the 1997 povertylevel for
a family of three. This does not include other sources of income, notably
the Earned Income Credit, which can add substantially to income.It also
assumes a steady level of labor supply across the year, which other re-
search indicates is unlikely for welfare recipients (Rangarajan, Schochet,
and Chu, 1998).
4.1.2 Comparison with Other Low-Income FamiliesTo provide a con-
text for interpreting these employment levels andwage and job charac-
teristics, we look at how former recipients are doing in comparison with
low-income families with children who have not recently received wel-
fare. We define this latter group as women with children underage 18
who have not recently (since 1995) been on welfare and whose family
income in 1996 was under 200 percent of poverty. Thisgroup comprises
30 percent of all women with children under 18.
More former recipients are working than mothers in other low-income
families: 61 percent compared to 54 percent. However,many more former
recipients are single parents. When we consider the percentage of families
with at least one adult employed, a somewhat higherpercentage of other
low-income families have workers: 86 percent comparedto 75 percent.
Overall, the difference in the probability of work is accounted for bythe
difference in family types.
The types of jobs former recipients are holdingare very similar to
those held by other low-income women with children who havenot
recently received welfare. The occupation and industry mix, theamount
of night-shift work, and the number holding multiple jobsare all similar
(Table 3). The biggest difference is in the percentage with healthinsur-Welfare Reform under PRWORA 195
ance from their employer: 23 percentof former recipients compared to 36
percent of other low-income mothers. Inaddition, although the median
hourly wage of former recipients is low ($6.61), it ishigher than that of
other low-income mothers ($6.06).
These results suggest that while former recipients areentering the
labor market at low wages and in entry-leveljobs, they are squarely
within the range of jobs held by the large groupof low-income mothers
with children who have not recently received cash assistance.It is impor-
tant to remember that this group ofleavers is an early cohort. Future
cohorts of leavers may be less job-ready or may befacing a less hospita-
ble labor market.
4.2 Child-Care Arrangements of FormerWelfare Recipients
The analysis of child-care arrangements is based on adifferent NSAF
sample than the analysis of welfare leavers' employment outcomes.The
unit of observation is the child, rather thanthe parent. The sample
includes children under the age of five with employedparents.3°
For this analysis, we focus only on the primarychild-care arrange-
ment, that is, the arrangement in whichthe child spent the largest num-
ber of hours while the parent was working.We divide nonparental
arrangements into four primary care categories.The first three are non-
parental care categories: center-based care (Head Start,preschool, pre-
kindergarten, nursery school, before- and after-schoolprograms); family
day care (care by nonrelatives outside thechild's home); and relative or
baby-sitter care (relative care, and nonrelative carein the child's home).31
Employed respondents who did not report using anyof the non-
parental arrangements described above are classified ashaving a parental
arrangement. The share of children of employed parentswith parental
arrangements in the NSAF (23 percent) is veryclose to the share (24
percent) of preschool children in the 1994 Survey of Incomeand Program
Participation who were cared for by their mother ortheir father while
their mother was working (Casper, 1997).
Quality ranges widely within each type of child-carearrangement, so
° "Parent" refers to the most knowledgeable adult in the household, who was the survey
respondent. For the sample used for child-care analyses, 83 percentof the parents were
mothers. In the remainder of the cases, the respondent was thefather, stepparent, grand-
parent, or other responsible adult. For more informationabout the NSAF child-care survey
data, see Schmidt, Sonenstein, and Capizzano (1999).
3Babysitters and nannies who come to the child's home weregrouped with relatives
because only 4 percent of all low-income families and 2 percentof current or former welfare
recipients used those arrangements. The before- andafter-school program question was
only asked of parents of 3-4-year-old children. For that age group,the programs typically
consist of center-based programs that meet before or afterhalf-day preschool programs.196Loprest, Schmidt & Witte
arrangement is not a proxy for quality. Policies governing qualitytreat
different kinds of arrangements differently,so understanding which
arrangements children are in could tell us something about which policy
levers could be used to improve quality.
4.2.1 Child-Care ArrangementsTable 4 shows the child-care arrange-
ments of 0-4-year-old children separately by four welfarestatus and
income categories. These categories include two breaks for those who
have ever been on cash assistance: current recipients and thosewho have
left AFDC since January 1995. The other twocategories include respon-
dents that have never received cash assistance: low-incomefamilies (fami-
lies with incomes less than 200% of poverty) and high-incomefamilies
(families with incomes greater than 200% of poverty).
It is important to emphasize that the sample includes onlyemployed
parents, and that the current-welfare-recipients category includes only
employed welfare recipients. Only 17 percent of the children aged0-4
that were currently receiving welfare had employedparents. In contrast,
57 percent of the children whose families had left welfare since1995, 60
percent of children whose families had left welfare before 1995, and 46
percent of low-income children whose families hadnever been on wel-
TABLE 4
Child-Care Arrangements by Welfare Status and Income(a)











Currently receiving welfare 33% 17% 35% 16%
(6.6) (3.9) (5.5) (4.0)
Left welfare since 1995 34% 17% 33% 17%
(4.7) (4.4) (4.3) (4.8)
Left welfare before 1995 37% 16% 24% 22%
(4.2) (3.5) (4.3) (3.7)
Never on welfare; Income 21% 14% 33% 31%
<200% of poverty
(2.3) (2.8) (3.0) (2.5)
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>200% of poverty
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fare had employed parents. Despite the small proportionof employed
welfare recipients, we are very much interested in this group.These
respondents give us an indication of the types of care arrangements
being used by welfare recipientswhich is of great interest as recipients
are moved into more extensiveemployment because of TANF work
requirements.
Table 4 indicates that the child-care arrangements of currentwelfare
recipients, former welfare recipients, and high-income childrendo not
differ significantly. The low-income children whose parentshave never
been on welfare, however, do stand out from these other groups:they
are more likely to be placed in parental careand less likely to be placed in
center-based care than the other groups of children. This may reflect the
lesser availability of child-care subsidies for this group.
The use of family day-care homes or relative or baby-sitter caredoes
not differ significantly by welfare status and income.While there has
been much discussion in the child-care policy arena about welfarerecipi-
ents depending heavily on relatives to care fortheir children, our results
indicate that this group is no more likely to use this form of carethan
other groups.
5. CONCLUSIONS
During the twentieth century, the United Stateshas substantially re-
formed its social welfare system every 30 years. These reforms haveall
come during unusual economic times.The first reform occurred during
the great depression of the 1930s. This reformgreatly increased the role
of the federal government in welfare policy and established acash assis-
tance program for low-income families withchildren. The reforms of the
thirties shaped welfare policy for the next 30 years.
The next wave of reform, called the "War on Poverty," cameduring
the sustained economic expansion of the 1960s.This reform substan-
tially expanded the social welfare net and the federal role, creatingsuch
programs as Head Start, Medicaid, and Medicare.This reform began the
trend to provide an increasing proportion of welfare benefits inkind
rather than in cash.
The most recent wave of reforms, two aspects ofwhich we examine in
this paper, came during the economic expansion of the 1990s.This wave
of reform was quite unlike the two that came before it.It sought to limit
the federal role in social welfare policy to providingbroad policy and
administrative guidelines and block grants to states. In response(and
through earlier federal waivers), state programs have changedmarkedly
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in many ways, with different combinations of requirements, incentives,
and services. Some states have devolved substantial policy and adminis-
trative responsibility to local government. Some social welfare functions
have been either privatized or "nonprofitized."
Under the latest set of reforms, state and local governments have
shifted substantial amounts of spending from cash assistance to direct
services. Most states adopted a work-first approach to welfare reform
that sought to move those that received cash assistance into jobsas
rapidly as possible. Many states have started diversionprograms to
reduce the number of families entering cash assistanceprograms. Much
increased state spending has gone to provide child-care services not only
to recipients of cash assistance, but also to other low-income families.
States have reduced the number of families receiving cash assistance and
increasing the proportion of cash assistance recipients that work.
Just as Medicaid has gradually been divorced from cash assistance,
many states are now severing the link between child-care services and
cash assistance. As noted in the title, the new welfare reformmay best
be characterized as Aid to Children with Working Families. Judging
from Congress's stated goal when passing PRWORA,an unintended
consequence of the welfare reform of the 1990s has been to place increas-
ing numbers of poor children in more formal child-care settings.
We still are in the early stages of the current welfare reform, and the
shape of the reform to date varies from state to state and (in states that
have devolved power) from locality to locality. Some overall trends in
social welfare policy are now becoming apparent. First,as was expected,
devolution has led to greater diversity in both cash-assistance and child-
care policies. Some states still run both cash-assistance and child-care
programs much like those that existed prior to the 1990s, but most states
now have social welfare programs in place that are markedly different
from their programs of the first half of the 1990s.
States have found a variety of ways to increase work and decrease
benefit receipt. In addition to mandated changes that require work activi-
ties and limit benefit receipt, states have used other policy and administra-
tive changes to move families to work. Some of these include shorter time
limits and fewer exemptions to work requirements than allowed under
PRWORA. States have also increased financial incentives by allowing
recipients who work to keep more benefits and by providing more work
supports. The whole structure and environment of many welfare pro-
grams have changed to encourage work and discourage cash assistance.
Welfare reform increased the federal child-care funding available to
states and allowed states to spend federal TANF funds on child care. In
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ing, and many have spent federal TANF funds on child care.Nonethe-
less, most states still do not have enough funds to provide subsidiesfor
all eligible applicants. Most still give priority to welfare recipients, and
working poor families often have to wait to receive subsidies. A handful
of states have guaranteed subsidies to all eligible families regardlessof
welfare status.
PRWORA also gave states some additional flexibility in setting pro-
vider reimbursement rates and family copayments. In addition, by sim-
plifying the rules and regulations for child-care subsidies, PRWORA
better enabled states to consolidate the administration of child-care pro-
grams. The additional flexibility granted by thelaw encouraged some
states to further devolve child-care administrationand policymaking to
the local level.
The welfare reform of the 1990s is still an unfinished product. It is not
clear how families with substantial barriers to employment wifi be
moved into work. Child-care policy is still not fully integrated or com-
pletely thought through. It is not clear how local governments wifi deal
with the substantial set of new responsibilities that have been thrust
upon them. While economicwisdom indicates that you cannot effec-
tively redistribute income at the local level, there are also arguments for
the increased efficiency of local-level programs to meet directservice
needs. It remains to be seen how well local governments can provide
cash and in-kind assistance.
To date, the welfare reform of the 1990s has taken place in a timeof
economic expansion when substantial numbers of new jobs arebeing
created. It is not clear how well suited the new set of welfare policies is
for an economic downturn. However, it seems likely that thefederal
block grant, when coupled with downturns in revenue for stateand
local government, wifi mean that welfare expenditures wifi provideless
of an economic stabilizer than the AFDC entitlement system did.
Congress is scheduled to revisit PRWORA in 2002. At that time, itis
important that clearer answers be available to some of thesenagging
questions.
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